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ABSTRACT. There are major concerns about the level of
personal borrowing, particularly sourced from credit cards.
This paper charts the progress of an initiative to create a
Responsible Lending Index (RLI) for the credit industry.
The RLI proposed to voluntarily benchmark lending
standards and promote best practice within the credit
industry by involving suppliers of credit, customer repre-
sentatives and regulators. However, despite initial support
from some banks, consumer bodies and the Chair of the
Treasury Select Committee, it failed to gain sufficient
support from financial institutions in its original format.
The primary reasons for this were related to the complexity
of building such a robust index and the banks trade body’s
fear of exposing its members to public scrutiny. A revised
alternative, the Responsible Lending Initiative, was pro-
posed which took into account these concerns. However,
the Association of Payment Clearing Service (APACS), the
trade body of the credit industry, then effectively destroyed
the proposal. This article describes an attempt to address the
challenges in the credit card industry with the initiation of
the RLI, reflected in stakeholder discourse and in the
context of a wider concern expressed by the involved
stakeholders in terms of the need for greater responsibility
in the banking industry’s lending practices.
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Lending, Responsibility, Stakeholders
List of Abbreviations: APACS: Association of Payment
Clearing Service; BBA: British Bankers Association; DTI:
Department of Trade and Industry; FSA: Financial Ser-
vices Authority; IVA: Individual Voluntary Arrangement;
OFT: Office of Fair Trading; RLI: Responsible Lending
Index; BCSB: Banking Code Standards Board
Introduction
The credit industry over the last 2 years has received
considerable adverse media coverage (Fletcher,
2006) for allowing an expansion of debt. Particular
individual tragic outcomes of suicide have been
blamed on irresponsible lending practices (BBC,
2005; Ronson, 2005). In response, a self-regulation
system was proposed to the leading banks who own
the credit cards. The key features of the proposal was
the creation of a voluntary benchmark—a Respon-
sible Lending Index (RLI), which would set stan-
dards and promote best practice in credit lending. A
defining factor of the index was its governance,
which was grounded in stakeholder involvement,
embracing not just the suppliers of credit—the
banks—but also the consumer movement, the vol-
untary sector through the credit advisory services, as
well as the government with the active interest of
the Chair of the Treasury Select Committee.
Stakeholder engagement involves a relationship
built on communication, consultation, dialogue and
partnerships with stakeholders (Heymans, 2006). It
aims to increase and improve the quality of involve-
ment of different stakeholders’ interests in certain
governance processes (ODPM, 2005). The quality of
engagement could be understood in terms of the
opportunity, which stakeholders have to provide
substantive input, as well as in terms of satisfaction
with the outcomes of the engagement process.
Since stakeholder engagement was first outlined by
Freeman in 1984, it has attracted considerable interest
both as an attractive idea of participation and in its
capacity to develop into a problematic concept like
‘stakeholder democracy’, which implies equality in
the right to participate. As Matten and Crane identify:
The basic proposition—that stakeholders participate in
processes of organizing, decision-making, and gover-
nance in corporations—is for many people an alluring
prospect. It chimes well with current demands for
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greater corporate accountability and offers a compel-
ling evaluative framework for assessing corporate
responsibilities to society. However, in an age of
intensified shareholder capitalism and increasing
complex global market systems, it can also appear to be
little more than a hopelessly idealistic vision (Matten
and Crane, 2005, p. 6).
In particular, they pose the managerial question of
how a corporation could realistically balance the
competing claims of disparate stakeholders in an
organised framework of corporate governance.
This article describes an attempt to address this
challenging balance in the credit card industry with
the initiation of the RLI, and analyses the context
of its unsuccessful launch. This outcome, the paper
will argue, leaves the concept of stakeholder par-
ticipation in the bank industry in the realm of
idealism.
This article has the following structure:
• history and context of credit lending in the
U.K.—the immediate context (problem-
based approach);
• description of the case—RLI concept, fol-
lowed by its initiative year-long story and
the involvement of various stakeholders;
• case reflections in stakeholder discourse, out-
lining the value and failure of the RLI; and
• discussion on the directions for development
of the credit industry.
The analysis and conclusions focus on understanding
the potential and shortcomings of the RLI in its
attempt to respond to the credit industry issue of
defining measurable standards.
Methods issues and academic involvement
This case study is based on the observation of the
evolving RLI initiative, an idea grounded in the
practice of the banking industry and from a per-
spective of its potential for reform and regulation.
This practice-derived initiative finds its reflection in
stakeholder discourse. This was conceptually the
point of origin for initiating the RLI by its creator, as
well as the concept which links the current credit
industry in the U.K. with the responsibility, which
the banking industry has to its customers.
The methodology is derived from the perspective
of Lawrence (1992) on problem-oriented research.
First, a significant emerging problem is selected
which allows to link the macro and micro levels of
analysis, respectively, the current development of the
credit industry in the U.K. in terms of its reform and
regulation of practices, and the specific RLI mech-
anism which addressed this. Then, key parameters
are examined (credit industry practices, stakeholder
relevance, the image and behaviour of banks) and
related to relevant theories (stakeholder framework,
corporate responsiveness and tragedy of the com-
mons). The analysis is conducted in light of under-
standing the potential and shortcomings of the RLI
in its attempt to respond to the credit industry issue
of defining measurable standards. The problem-ori-
ented approach is reflected in the critique and con-
clusions, drawing on the RLI case for lessons
relevant to the stakeholder discourse in terms of
addressing the current practice in the credit industry,
rather than embedding the RLI in a theory-building
stakeholder context.
The second-named author was invited to partic-
ipate in the RLI initiative by its creator, Steve
Round (then CEO of Hurlstons), a management
consultant specialising in the credit card industry.
Through attendance observation, the first-named
author closely followed the progress made by Round
in negotiating support for the initiative with various
stakeholders within the credit industry. Primary data
was obtained and the authors attended a number of
meetings with Steve Round, where observations
were made on the attitude of stakeholders repre-
senting differing opinions. As identified by Fry
(1973), direct observation has some challenges that
the researcher needs to address—the large amount of
time invested in observation studies, the decision on
whether to be a hidden or visible observer and the
possible loss of objectivity. When attending meet-
ings, the observer was introduced as a member of the
RLI team and as a researcher. The impact of having
a silent observer present hopefully has been minimal,
as both Round and the negotiating party were
professionals and would have had no reason to
withhold comments due to the observer’s presence.
Vidich (1955) has looked at the issue of observer
objectivity and identified two main concerns. The
researcher may influence the character of data col-
lected or interpret the data subjectively, both of
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which could lead to distortion. Although viewed
from the stakeholder viewpoint as belonging to the
RLI team, the observer supported by the second-
named author maintained a distance to the proposal.
A range of data sources were used in the literature
review and have been drawn upon during the
analysis.
The growth of the credit industry
In June 2005 the total U.K. consumer debt
amounted to £1.1 trillion and is growing by
£1 million every 4 min (Talbot, 2006). Less than a
century ago the credit industry barely existed, so
what has caused this rapid expansion? The consumer
boom following World War I resulted in a shift from
the earlier mentality of saving up for a product and
then purchasing it for cash to ‘‘buy now pay later’’
(Olney, 1989, 1991). Following the Second World
War a period of growth fuelled the credit industry.
After years of rationing, consumers were eager to get
hold of goods instantaneously. Arrangements for
payment at a later date were convenient for both
buyers and producers. Shay (1956) classified credit
available to post-war U.S. consumers into two cat-
egories: cash lending and instalment sales financing.
These were typically available from commercial
banks, sales and personal finance companies and
credit unions. Allison et al. (2003) found a similar
post-war trend in the U.K., which was also followed
by the growth of hire purchase and credit-based mail
ordering.
In 1958, the Bank of America issued the first all-
purpose credit card, which evolved into Visa and in
1966 the MasterCard was created. Barclays launched
the first credit card in Britain, the Barclaycard, in
1966. During the 1950s through to the 1970s U.K.
Governmental control over credit lending was tight.
Since the deregulation of the U.K. credit industry in
the early 1980s, both supply and demand have
transformed and expanded significantly (Stein,
2004). The total number of credit and charge cards
in issue by banks in the U.K. has grown from
6,410,000 in 1975 to 71,887,000 cards in year
ending 2004 (APACS, 2006). The leading credit
card issuers in the U.K. include Barclays, Lloyds
TSB, Royal Bank of Scotland, HSBC, HBOS and
MBNA (Europe). In addition to traditional high
street banks, the credit card industry has seen a rise of
new entrants from international credit issuers, such
as Capital One. Since, the 1990s internet-based
lenders have also competed for their market share.
Some established firms have set up a new branch to
cater for the internet market, such as Prudential’s
venture Egg plc. Other startups such as EasyMoney
are purely internet-based or use various channels of
offering consumers credit through in-store finance
options, buy-now-pay-later schemes, catalogue sales
and store cards.
Other stakeholders—suppliers and
customers
The suppliers consist of companies who provide
credit issuers with technology-based solutions such
as web software, security services, enterprise re-
source planning, customer relationship management
software and the physical materials suppliers (statio-
nery). The credit industry caters for both corporate
and private customers, but this paper focuses on the
latter in the U.K. only. Since the early 1990s low
unemployment, reasonably stable inflation and base
rates, and rising house prices in the U.K. have in-
creased consumer confidence. Consumer spending
has followed this period of economic stability un-
checked by any controls. Ironfield-Smith et al.
(2005) have outlined the economic issues facing
U.K. consumers: the risk of increasing interest rates
affecting those who have considerable loans and
mortgages to pay off; the slowdown of the housing
market impacting on consumer confidence; the
increasing U.K. current budget deficit which may
result in tax rises; and the large U.S. current account
deficit, which if not curbed, may lead to interna-
tional economic instability. Since November 2003
the Bank of England has consistently raised interest
rates from 3.50% to a peak of 4.75%, increasing to
5% in December 2006. Coupled with rising petrol
and fuel prices, this has led to U.K. consumers
tightening their belts (Moore, 2005).
Knight (2005) noted that a record 26,000 prop-
erty repossession orders were issued in the first three
months of 2005. Figures from the Department of
Trade and Industry (DTI, 2006) show the number of
bankruptcies for the past 12 months total 60,102.
This exceeds the total of 43,425 bankruptcies for the
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previous twelve months by 38.4%. The increase in
the number of people setting up individual voluntary
arrangements (IVAs) with their creditors was up 95%
on the previous period. This may be partly due to
changes in bankruptcy legislation and the rise of debt
intermediaries who advertise their services for a fee
to create an IVA. However, there seems to be a clear
underlying upward trend.
Technological advancements are particularly
crucial to the credit industry. Figures from the
Association for Payment Clearing Services (APACS,
2006) show that credit and debit card fraud totalled
£504.8 million in 2004. On March 8th 2005 BBC
News reported that card fraud over the internet,
phone and mail order, amounts to £150.8 million a
year in the U.K. ‘Skimming’, where a card’s mag-
netic strip is electronically copied, costs U.K. card-
holders over £100 million a year. APACS estimate
that since the introduction of chip and PIN, debit
and credit card fraud has fallen by 13%, now totalling
£33 million. As security becomes increasingly tight
due to advances in technology fraudsters are target-
ing the weakest link in the chain – the human aspect.
Educating card holders about keeping their pin
number secret will be vital in the combat against
crime. The response by lenders to card fraud will
increasingly be of interest to consumers.
The 1971 Crowther Committee concluded that
users of consumer credit should be ‘‘treated as adults,
who are fully capable of managing their own
financial affairs, and not to restrict their freedom of
access to it in order to protect the relatively small
minority who get into difficulties’’ (Lord Crowther,
1971, p. 153). The subsequent Consumer Credit Act
was introduced in 1974 and grounded in this phi-
losophy remained un-reviewed until the new mil-
lennium. A new consumer credit act of 2005 took
into account the new ways of borrowing, for
example, the growth of credit cards, and incorpo-
rated the banking code developed by the banking
code standards board. However, there is little
transparency on the code’s operation, for example,
why the code is published, and there is no external
scrutiny, which would allow a consumer to under-
stand whether their lender is embracing the code or
just maintaining minimal compliance.
The credit industry has been traditionally self-
regulated, monitored by the Financial Services
Authority (FSA). However, the increasing dissatis-
faction of consumers about lending practices, the
number of people considered to be struggling with
debt repayments and unfavourable media attention
(Fletcher, 2006) over debt-related suicides, such as
that of Richard Cullen (Ronson, 2005), has led the
Government, consumer bodies and the industry to
review this situation. Ironfield-Smith et al. (2005)
establish that there is public support for govern-
mental or financial industry regulation to prevent
people from getting into unmanageable debt situa-
tions. The trend is for consumer groups and media
coverage to drive politicians to act.
Allison et al. (2003) show that the importance of
Ando and Modigliani’s (1963) Life Cycle Hypothesis,
which models the average propensity to consume
over the lifetime of an individual, is that the
demographic formation of the population will
determine the demand for credit in a given country.
However, access to credit and the ability to repay it
depends more on an individual’s age and socio-
economic group than the aggregate demand for
credit within an economy. Many lenders use
demographic and lifestyle information, such as CA-
CI’s Acorn and Experian’s Mosaic classifications, to
target potential customers (Stevens, 2004). This has
led to people being given far more unsecured credit
than they can afford to repay, such as 100% of
their salary and credit card limits that have moved
the product on from being a short-term financial
purchasing instrument into a source of long-term
debt.
The changes in the structure of society have also
given rise to new groups of borrowers. The break-
down of the nuclear family, resulting in single-per-
son households, single parents and independent
females with financial responsibilities living in an
increasingly expensive country has lead to the use of
credit as an additional income. Tondeur notes that
groups within lower income brackets are more likely
to need to borrow due to existing problems and
could experience severe problems should something
go wrong because they often have fewer assets to fall
back on (Talbot, 2006). This is particularly visible in
the younger generations, from late teens to 30s, who
are subjected to high levels of debt from a young age
(Hurlston, 2005). The removal of university grants
exposes students to find ways of funding themselves.
According to NatWest (2005) an average graduate
has £12,640 debt upon graduation.
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Credit lending therefore is composed of complex
interwoven groups far beyond a simple supplier and
customer involvement. Customers who get into
trouble have in effect ‘proxy supporters’ in the form
of the various credit advice services supplied by
voluntary organisations. Consequently, there is an
interest from government beyond simple market
regulation, with concerns about consumer levels of
debt and confidence in the economy as well as a
wider responsibility to its citizens.
Shortcomings in the banking system—
the business case for responsible lending
The U.K. banking industry is well established and
heavily regulated. Currently banks do not exploit
the opportunity to impress customers by achieving
over and above the legally required levels of service,
partly because they do not see a competitive
advantage in this but also due to the longstanding
integrity and responsibility in banking (Cowton,
2002; Green, 1989; Hutchings, 2005). However,
through implementing socially responsible lending
and pursuing brand differentiation, a lender could
gain sustainable competitive advantage. As Cowton
(2002) identifies, the Co-operative Bank for exam-
ple has marketed extensively its socially responsible
banking activities and attracted new customers by
this approach. Informed customers are less likely to
feel post-purchase dissonance or that they have been
swindled. A sense of pride in working for an em-
ployer that the public perceive as responsible it is
suggested increases employee motivation levels
(Pryce, 2002). Motivated staff communicate better
with customers, have a positive attitude, go the extra
mile and ultimately sell more. Consequently banks
that adopt best practice would be likely to experi-
ence increased profits.
The industry is often portrayed by the media as
malicious and hungry for profits at any expense to
the consumer (Cowton, 2002; Green, 1989; Parker,
2005). A report by uSwitch.com (2006) found that
88% of successful credit card applicants were not
requested to show any proof of their income. 95% of
card holders had not been asked for evidence of their
monthly outgoings when applying for credit. The
report also found that details given by applicants
were not verified in nine out of 10 applications. All
of this can leave the lender with an unclear picture of
the customers’ ability to service debt. This has re-
sulted in lenders issuing credit limits which are far
beyond the cardholders’ annual earnings or afford-
ability, which has in turn resulted in a drastic in-
crease in bad debt being written off since 2000
(Cattermole, 2004). Unless banks take measures to
address this, the situation is likely to become worse.
The classical assumption on protecting consumers
argues that efficient markets are much more effective
than formal regulations (Stigler, 1971). However Sir
Cullum McCarthy (2004), Chairmen of the FSA,
argues that retail financial services are far from effi-
cient. There is market failure due to ‘‘absence of
information; the lack of financial literacy by buyers;
information asymmetry between provider and pur-
chaser; the market is characterised by credence
goods—where the benefit can only be observed after
the passage of time, if at all—and principal/agent
problems’’ (McCarthy, 2004, p.22). As this appears
to be so in retail financial services, there is a case for
taking action and introducing statutory regula-
tion—a theme that has been explored a number of
times by the Treasury Select Committee.
The push from the Government and media to-
wards an increasingly regulated industry and the pull
of increased profits through adopting best practice
shows that there is an opportunity for self-regulation
to be developed further. There are already several
vehicles for raising the standards within the credit
industry at present. Most lenders are affiliated to
trade associations such as the Association for Pay-
ment Clearing Services (APACS) and the British
Banker’s Association (BBA) and follow their vol-
untary codes of conduct. However not all lenders,
such as those targeting the financially deprived with
high profits in mind, are keen to pursue responsible
lending practices. Thus, formal legislation as opposed
to self-regulation can be argued to be more desirable
(Cowton, 2002).
All lenders must comply with relevant Govern-
ment initiatives, such as the expected amendments to
the Consumer Credit Act. Any new legislation or
regulation has to be brought in at industry level and
the industry will generally argue for the lowest
common denominator. Such initiatives can only
move as fast as the slowest members in the industry,
which may have reasons to delay regulation or to
cover up bad practices. It can therefore be argued
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that neither existing industry self-regulation nor
governmental legislation give sufficient opportunity
for companies to differentiate their brand. Was there
an alternative, which would both satisfy the concerns
over irresponsible lending and reward banks by
giving them a competitive advantage?
The Responsible Lending Index (RLI)
To resolve this matter, the idea for the Responsible
Lending Index (RLI) was generated as a proposal for
a voluntary index for the credit industry which
would allow lenders to measure themselves accord-
ing to the degree of responsibility in their corporate
processes. The measures of responsibility were
grounded in the outcomes of a consultation process
with key stakeholders from the industry, consumer
groups, money advice organisations and the
Government.
Round’s background was in the credit industry
and he had represented the banking sector in front
of the media when soaring debt became an issue in
2000. His observation on the banks focused on their
‘bland response’ to the question on the criteria by
which they conducted their lending practices. A
culture of ‘arrogance and secrecy’ prevailed, which,
he believed, did not serve the banks’ interests and
contrasted against the good lending practices of
some banks that were left under-promoted. The
focus on ‘responsible lending’ was derived from the
European Directive for homogenisation. In October
2004 the Commission adopted an amended proposal
for the Directive for the regulation of consumer
credit. The European Parliament under the con-
sumer credit directive conducted responsible lend-
ing tests within a philosophy that ‘credit = debt =
bad’1.
Round’s marketing background can be argued to
have influenced the strategy behind the RLI, which
was in essence a win–win marketing approach. The
first was to promote the responsible practices of
some banks, giving them visibility to the public. The
RLI would give lenders a chance to stand out from
the crowd, achieve over and above the minimum
standards and raise the bar without legislation.
Lenders would be able to promote their rating in
public affairs communications and receive positive
media attention, developing their own reputational
advantage. This would be reflected in customer
choices and result in greater profitability to the
lender. In addition to this proactive stance, the ap-
proach was also defined in preventive terms, where
the RLI promoted industry reform to circumvent
regulation. Round was concerned that unless the
banks adopted a proactive stance to responsible
lending which engaged stakeholders in a process of
transparent practice of credit management, the drive
for homogenisation would impose a regulation based
on such a dichotomous philosophy. Such measures
would be detrimental to the credit industry and its
contingent market efficiency.
The RLI concept hoped to achieve a commonly
accepted picture of what responsible lending should
look like. This concept is illustrated in Figure 1. The
broadest definition does not allow sufficient dis-
tinction between responsible and irresponsible
practices. Likewise, it is impossible to ever define a
single point of responsibility without narrowing the
concept too much, and in doing so alienating many
stakeholders over issues that cannot be agreed on.
The solution is therefore likely to lie within the
middle ground.
Deciding what to measure
The RLI aimed to define measurable standards based
on protocols, which would be accepted and adopted
by banks. For example, marketing and solicitation,
acquisition of customers, account maintenance and
processing, and dealing with delinquency are rep-
resentative of the types of issues which would be
assessed by the RLI. Within these areas standard
processes would be identified for every aspect of
business. Each process would then be weighted
according to its relative importance in terms of
Too much information, a 
loose definition, too broad a 
concept 
What RLI wanted to 
achieve, a defined picture 
as opposed to a single point 
One point – not achievable  
 . 
Figure 1. Defining the concept of responsible lending.
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responsible lending. Ultimately the RLI would
produce ratings similar to those to Moody’s or the
Fitch ratings, based on which bank policies would be
adopted and implemented.
How to measure a process
The RLI would weigh, value and audit processes,
which could be used as benchmarks for the industry.
Defining the processes to be considered when rating
lenders is best illustrated by a basic example.
Say delinquency has occurred. The lender may
respond by
1. Sending a pleasant letter asking is there a
problem and offering support.
2. Sending a threatening letter.
3. Sending a threatening letter and charging a
fee of £25.
4. Involving the debt collector at this stage.
Each stakeholder group would decide in isolation
how to rank the above responses from most desired
practice to least desired practice. The responses
would vary depending on which stakeholder group
is ranking the process. For example, a consumer
body representing the needs of consumers may at-
tach most value to a lenient approach, such as a
pleasant letter. On the other hand, a bank’s objective
is to maximise profits and they may view a fee as a
crucial deterrent to late payments. However, in
general the responses from different stakeholder
groups should be similar enough to be used in sta-
tistical modelling.
Each identified process would be modelled and
the responses ranked by each stakeholder group in
the same way. The results for all processes, as ranked
by stakeholders, would then be collated and each
process weighted according to its relevance on a
scale from one to 10, where 10 is significant and one
non-significant. For example, processes for tackling
delinquency could have a weight of eight. Other
processes, such as the font size chosen for displaying
information in the summary box on a statement may
be weighted much closer to one.
Each process would be weighed in this manner,
although inevitably the weight attached to some
processes would be totally disputed. For example,
automatically increasing a credit limit may be seen
as irresponsible by debt advisor groups, whereas a
bank may consider this a way of rewarding cus-
tomers and not a significant cause of debt problems.
Out of 100 processes, hopefully stakeholders would
be broadly in agreement about 90 of the processes
but with the remaining 10 there would likely be
larger differences in opinion. Therefore, to reach an
agreement, an independently chaired debate would
be necessary.
Transparency
The transparency of the real cost of credit card debt is
at the heart of the process. As a result of the mortgage
miss-selling crisis of the 1980s, mortgage lenders are
now required to now produce an exact table of the real
money cost of borrowing to new customers. This is
not a practice applied for credit cards although re-
cently some lenders have responded to the demands
for transparency by showing what the cost of bor-
rowing for that month is when the minimum amount
is paid off. The industry is instead dominated by
headline APR percentage rates, where for example, a
rate of 9.5% could in reality be more expensive than a
rate of 15.5%, depending on whether the outstanding
credit balance is calculated on a daily, weekly, end of
period or continuous compounding basis. This shows
that the needed transparency which would allow
comparison between credit products, is absent in the
industry, as is consequently the consumers’ under-
standing of the processes and input variables involved
in the calculations, except for those who are highly
literate in financial issues.
For the RLI to be robust and credible, it would
require an independent observer throughout all
stages and would have to be supported by the money
advice and consumer organisations. The purpose of
having an independent observer as Chair of a man-
agement group comprising representatives of Finan-
cial Institutions and Consumer Organisations would
be to ensure the rigour and integrity of the audit. The
observer would not actually take part in completing
the audit on those companies signing up to the RLI
(i.e. members). Their role would be to ensure that
the processes looked at and the benchmarks set were
sound and represented all stakeholder requirements
satisfactorily. For the RLI to remain relevant, the bar
Irresponsible Lending
would need to be constantly raised and revised as
developments in the environment took place. Here,
again the independent observer would ensure eval-
uation and accommodation of changes without biases
to any particular stakeholder group.
Analysis and critique of the proposed
RLI—stakeholders’ perspectives
Recognising that different stakeholders—banks,
Consumer Groups and Government—would have
different motivations for supporting the RLI, a series
of potential issues arise. The authors have reflected
on these issues in the following section.
If the RLI were implemented, the benefits for the
banking stakeholders would be measured against the
economic cost of transactions. This is the cost of
making an economic exchange, i.e. the time, effort
and resources required for a company to supply a
customer with credit or for a customer to select and
apply for credit. The first question that the proposed
RLI had to answer for the lenders was whether the
benefits of implementing responsible lending prac-
tices outweighed the foregone profits from not tar-
geting vulnerable customers or applying high default
fees. Late payments earn banks more than £1 billion
a year (Treanor, 2006) and interest on overdrafts
amounts to £3 billion a year (Levene, 2006). The
transaction costs for banks would include the cost of
implementing the necessary processes to comply
with the RLI standards, acquiring accreditation (to
be recognised as a responsible lender) and marketing
that status.
Banks would also have to calculate the opportu-
nity cost of investing the time, money and effort in
another project instead. The difficulty lies with
quantifying these transaction costs, as all calculations
would be based on estimates of future exchanges
between lenders and borrowers, which cannot be
known until a standard is implemented. The trans-
action costs for the customer consist of the increased
time spent searching and evaluating alternatives as
the amount of information increases (opportunity
cost of time), and the inconvenience factor as doc-
umentation and information required to be provided
in order to receive credit increases.
At the time of its launch, the RLI had to also
satisfy other important stakeholders, like the gov-
ernment, which was being pressured by consumer
groups and by the media to regulate the credit
industry. While all governments are concerned
about the impact of borrowing on the wider econ-
omy, for a Labour government in particular there are
also issues of social stratification (Toynbee, 2004).
Matsuyama (2000) has argued that the distribution of
wealth within a society in one period of time ‘‘affects
the supply and demand for credit, which in turn
affects the distribution of wealth in the following
period’’ (p. 743). The author also observes that in a
steady state of economy where the population is
polarised into the rich and the poor, the household
an individual is born into tends to determine their
level of lifetime wealth. A perspective adopted by
consumer groups is that the poor are in fact being
kept in poverty by unattractive credit terms. Rah-
man (2005) has estimated that Britain’s poor pay up
to £500 million a year in excessive interest charges.
Rahman also alleges that irresponsible lending
practices keep the poor in debt. As the mainstream
lending market is closed to them, they can face
interest rates of 150% and upwards. Opposition to
this opinion is led by those lenders who argue that
access to credit, even with high charges, is better
than no access.
Since the introduction of unsecured credit into
the consumer market, those in the lower brackets of
society have been able to purchase goods and ser-
vices that may have been unobtainable without
credit arrangements. They have also had the
opportunity to improve their status in society in the
long run. For example, if a low skilled worker was
made redundant, but had access to credit through
overdraft and credit card arrangements, they could
finance further education and hence improve their
employability and level of expected future wages.
This would allow the poor to break free from their
‘‘poverty trap’’ by using unsecured credit. If
responsible lending practices were enforced, this
may no longer be an option. Those in poverty
would remain poor and social inequalities would be
further established.
While a Labour Government’s role is often as-
sumed to include distribution of wealth within a
society, at least to the extent of looking after those
who are less well off, direct intervention by gov-
ernment to bailout all those struggling with financial
distress, does not seem to be a sustainable solution.
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Firstly, it would not be encouraging society to take
personal responsibility for financial affairs if people
knew that they would be bailed out should they
experience problems. Also the costs for such an
assistance scheme would escalate, as the number of
people relying on Government help would increase.
Secondly, benefits or credits are bound to be means-
tested. Those from lower socio-economic classes,
who are likely to experience financial problems, may
be defeated by the complexity of completing appli-
cation forms. They may also choose not to apply for
Government assistance due to loss of personal pride.
Such schemes therefore run the risk that well in-
tended relief would not reach its target.
From a political perspective such a scheme is not
likely to be a vote winner. Taxpayers are likely to
question why they should foot the bill through taxes
for avoidable financial distress. An alternative that
would aid mobility within social classes and decrease
the amount of financial distress experienced by the
public is to pursue financial inclusion schemes for
the deprived. Introducing comprehensive personal
finance tuition in the early stages of education e.g. at
GCSE level would improve overall financial literacy.
Debt counselling services support the view that
education should act as a solution to the problem at
its source by introducing a fundamental change in
consumer behaviour, rather than offering remedies
after the damage has been done.
In addition to the social and economic aspects
raised, Round also expressed that the RLI needs to be
evaluated based on the practicality of implementing
it. Although overall the response from both the
Financial Institutions and the Consumer Organisa-
tions as stakeholders was that the RLI is a good idea
in principle, they were concerned that it would be
expensive, resource consuming, hard to define and
difficult to implement. Many stakeholders also raised
the question of the positioning of the RLI with re-
gards to the other initiatives such as those initiated by
the DTI, the BBA, the OFT, the Treasury Select
Committee, the Basel Accreditation and the regular
auditing by the FSA. The RLI would need to clearly
differentiate itself as a standard that brings the other
initiatives together if it were to be meaningful and
worth the effort required to create it.
Many banks articulated concerns about how the
RLI could turn into the ‘‘Irresponsible Lending
Index’’. This would follow from intense competi-
tion between banks to achieve high scores. Evidently
some will score higher than others. This may force
some banks into action ‘‘to ensure they are not
bottom of the pile’’, but there was equally anxiety
regarding the possible difficulty of raising a low
score. Those who have scored worse than their
competitors may attract media pressure and finger
pointing, which may have undesired effects on a
bank’s profitability. To add insult to injury, those
who would be rated would have also contributed
financially towards establishing the index. If an RLI
standard were to be agreed, applying it consistently
could also prove problematic. How should an
organisation be ranked when it consists of a con-
glomerate of 8–10 separate divisions, which each
have different processes and operations? Another
point raised was that different lending institu-
tions target different risk profiles, which will evi-
dently be reflected in their processes and the
resulting score.
The fundamental question of whose responsibility
it is to ensure lending within limits remains unan-
swered. As a voluntary self-regulating index the RLI
may not necessarily tackle the issue of those who are
determined to pursue irresponsible borrowing
practices a problem not just confined to the lenders.
A report by uSwitch (2006) found that seven out of
eight credit applicants were untruthful when stating
their annual income details:
…applicants least likely to be truthful about their in-
comes are all from the most vulnerable groups, namely
the self-employed, students, the unemployed, and
those on low incomes (White, 2006, pp. 2–3).
There is a strong case for not limiting peoples’ access
to credit and hence their mobility within a society
and for not questioning their judgement as identified
by the Crowther Committee in 1971. However, it
seems that there is an even stronger case for
enforcing responsible lending practices. The number
of people facing financial distress is increasing as are
the costs of writing off bad debts. Until financial
literacy education has a significant impact on the
behaviour of consumers, the banks are well advised
to consider lending responsibly in order to protect
their own reputation and the well being of their
customers. Over the course of 9 months during
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2005/2006 a series of meetings were held in which
these issues were debated. It became clear that while
the consumer bodies were prepared to look at the
proposal in more detail, some banks and in particular
the Banking Code Standards Board (BCSB), who
saw the RLI as undermining their authority in the
industry, vocally made their opposition known.
With this resistance little progress was being made.
From the Responsible Lending Index
to the responsible lending initiative
Round has summarised the outcome that ‘‘without a
clear consensus on the definition of responsible
lending, comparing them [lenders] would be at best
difficult and at worst impossible’’. The RLI in its
original format failed to gain sufficient stakeholder
support to be pursued further.
The original proposition may have seemed too
revolutionary to many lenders. Hurlstons Consulting
however recognised an opportunity and rather than
pursuing a dead end, adjusted the idea to suit the cur-
rent climate and the willingness of banks to take action
on a smaller scale. The resulting proposition has been
called the Responsible Lending Initiative (retaining the
abbreviation RLI) and is concerned with developing a
framework for responsible lending. Unlike the index,
which would be an actual product, the initiative would
be a forum for stakeholder engagement. This would be
possible through stakeholders contributing to discus-
sion, sharing current procedures on best practice and
commissioning academic research into areas raised by
stakeholders. The differentiating factors between the
revised initiative and other initiatives currently in the
industry are that the Responsible Lending Initiative
would still be grounded in stakeholder engagement
and monitoring by having consumer organisations
involved in it and that it would aim to be transparent
(most other initiatives are ‘‘closed shops’’ to consumers
and the media).
The industry regulators such as the British
Bankers’ Association (BBA) and the Banking Code
Standards Board (BCSB) were not very supportive
of the original RLI concept, questioning the need
for an additional standard to be introduced into the
industry. It seemed that they feared their authority
was being undermined or bypassed by the RLI.
Consumer organizations openly pledged their sup-
port for the initiative and some of the banks con-
sulted appear to be showing an interest. John McFall,
MP, Chairmen of the Treasury Select Committee,
commented at a public meeting on the RLI on the
26th of October 2005 that the initiative sounds
good, but whatever the outcome, the industry
should not lose sight of striving towards best practice
and data sharing.
Round used several tools to advance the agenda of
the RLI. Firstly, setting a deadline for pledges of
support was crucial in ensuring momentum. The
timing was also critical in terms of publicity—post-
Christmas news headlines often display stories of over
spending on credit cards and the rising debt moun-
tain. The RLI would have given banks an opportu-
nity to respond to the negative publicity. Secondly,
inviting McFall to address the public meeting on the
RLI also sent signals that the initiative should be
taken seriously. Round subsequently used McFall to
provide leverage in negotiations, referring to the
‘‘worst possible outcome’’ whereby the Treasury
Select Committee could pursue legislation because
the banks have not been willing to take part in an
initiative such as the RLI. In this case Round was
drawing on the perception that self-regulation was
preferable to imposed controls (Kaye, 2003).
During the process, Round moved from purely
lobbying for support into the role of a negotiator.
The initial RLI proposal proved unachievable be-
cause Round, the consumer organisations and the
banks held different positions. Round wanted to
establish an index and the banks wanted to protect
their brand. To gain support for the revised RLI
Round focused on the other stakeholders and their
interests and how they could be reconciled with the
banks. Round kept the banks involved as it was in
the banks’ interest to continue discussion on
responsible lending practices, as participation in any
initiative will promote their brand and may ease the
pressure from the legislative bodies. Round’s interest
lay with helping banks promote themselves in terms
of their achievements and protecting themselves
from cumbersome legislation. Ultimately banks need
a mechanism to address the fear that accusations of
irresponsible lending would damage profits, and
Round needed their support to successfully launch
the RLI.
The new Responsible Lending Initiative propo-
sition seemed to be gaining sufficient support with
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the Chairmen of two major banks indicating they
would financially support a pilot study. It also of-
fered considerable academic research possibilities
from evaluation of the initiative and broadening the
scope of the study to cover experiences in conti-
nental Europe and the U.S. Consumer behaviour,
financial literacy, the impact of education and
the moral question of whose responsibility it is
to ensure borrowing were also possible further
research subjects. However, this was not to be as on
the 3rd of April 2006 Round received a letter from
APACS effectively killing the initiative by saying
that members collectively had a lack of general
interest.
Observations and conclusion
This case study has provided a practice-based case
reflecting a current social and credit industry issue, to
be added to the growing interest in stakeholder
democracy and a context for business ethics litera-
ture. In essence, the Responsible Lending Index
(RLI) was welcomed as a good idea by most stake-
holders but failed to gain sufficient support to be
pursued further in its original format. The reasons
for this are examined here in the context of stake-
holder and ethics discourse.
It can be argued that the main reason for the
failure of the RLI was that the banks feared the
repercussions of any negative rating and in particular
adverse effects on their brand. The initiative was
effectively stopped by APACS because it was per-
ceived as being ‘‘...unnecessary duplication of work
and effort’’2. The APACS letter went on to justify
this conclusion by making reference to:
• sharing best practice through trade journals;
• extensive research already commissioned on
the U.K. credit market;
• extensive lobbying already in existence, pub-
lic relation initiatives; and
• the industry was already at the forefront of
responsible lending.
Perhaps, the confidence of APACS to turn down the
initiative was also supported by the current U.K.
Government response to the European Consumer
Credit Directive, where its opinion included the
proposition to ‘‘…remove the concept of responsi-
ble lending’’ in the context of ensuring there are
enough adequate provisions on information and
licensing (DTI, 2005, p. 7). In essence then APACS
remained within the traditional confines of corpo-
rate engagement and views on codes of ethics out-
lined by Brinkmann and Ims (2003) and as identified
in the Code of Banking Practice (Cowton, 2002).
The literature on ethical banking is set within a
paradigm of thinking which argues that as an insti-
tution banks in principle have a higher duty to
consumers (George, 1992; Green, 1989). However,
the credit card lenders would seem to have remained
somewhat distant from this lofty aim, perhaps due to
the nature of their customer relations. In contrast to
the more direct and personal relationship between
the bank and the customer, it can be argued that the
credit sub-sector is more profit-driven and less ab-
sorbed in ensuring responsibility to its customers.
Was there a lack of leadership by the banks and
their respective trade bodies, particularly within
APACS? As evidenced by the numerous affinity
charity and trade union cards and the more recent
American Express Red, the credit service industry is
not slow to embrace market-lead social initiatives
when they are profitable, but equally, in such ini-
tiatives the involvement of stakeholders takes place
at the periphery. When it comes to governance
however, the RLI case study illustrates a different
story.
It is important to question why some banks did
not break away and support the RLI even though it
failed to gather industry-wide support. Round be-
lieves it is simply not in the nature of banks to break
away. While the Royal Bank of Scotland showed
the greatest interest and thought it was a good idea,
they believed it was too difficult to implement and a
matter of significant resources and time. Due to a
lack of support from key decision makers, the RLI
concept was not sufficiently compelling for some
banks to break away and/or move the BBA and
APACS to endorse the initiative.
In contrast to this attribution to the power of
persuasive leaders, behaviour is also explored within
the literature on stakeholders and their collective
action to influence their environment. For example,
the work of Munshi (2006) in the context of the
Scotch whisky industry provides a social construc-
tionist perspective which helps shed light on
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stakeholder group action in an industry context. The
author argues that industries are not ‘‘merely clusters
of competing firms, but social and cognitive systems
in their own right’’ (Munshi, 2006, p. 4). Such an
approach to stakeholder behaviour argues that
stakeholders are most likely to take collective action
when they are both protecting their interest and are
bounded by their shared identity, based on group
membership (Rowley and Moldoveanu, 2003). In a
similar theme explored by Munshi (2006) on the
Scotch whisky industry, the group collectively
forced one major manufacturer to withdraw its
product. As Munshi observes,
[t]hese socially constructed representations in indus-
tries takes the form of shared narratives and beliefs
with which stakeholders of the industry can collec-
tively and individually identify. Thus, changes that
are perceived as being radically different from those
shared mental models will increase the chances of
industry level collective stakeholder action (p.14)
Reflecting on the RLI case, it follow analogically
that the credit industry collectively resists this at-
tempt for a consolidated reform in a responsible
lending direction, led by their individual motivations
to remain competitive in the market. Munshi’s work
refers to the Tragedy of the Commons, which holds
that ‘‘stakeholders will forsake their long-term col-
lective benefits for their immediate short-term eco-
nomic self-interests’’ and argues that the opposite is
visible in her case study (p.14). In the case of the
RLI, it is the collective resistance which is driven by
short-term self-interest, which is yet another way of
looking at and confirming the Tragedy of the
Commons. Seen from this perspective, the concept
of ‘‘stakeholder participation’’ as it represents the
role of consumers in responsible credit practices is an
oxymoron, since it is only a representation of this
collective resistance.
Outside the stakeholder discourse, the develop-
ment of RLI reflects a number of issues raised by
the business ethics literature as it relates to the
banking industry practices. For example, Keep’s
(2003) work on economic motivations to sustain
the practice of business lies can be evidenced in the
desire of credit card suppliers to keep the real
costs of borrowing a secret. The current disclosure
of estimated interest cost for the month, now
disclosed on credit card bills, looks transparently
attractive but fails to explain the real cost when
applied on a continuous basis. The reward and
commissioning structure for credit staff is never
revealed. Therefore the complex issues of ethical
decision-making identified by Beu et al. (2003)
would suggest that credit staff could be inclined to
encourage extended borrowing as their own jobs
and performance related pay may depend on
encouraging borrowing.
Offering credit to all is justified by the credit
industry by claims of widening people’s social
choices, but can this be justified against the human
misery seen by the credit counselling services, which
can lead to suicide? For example, the selling of a
drink to an alcoholic would be viewed as unethical
and be roundly condemned. Is not constantly
extending credit to someone who eventually is un-
able to pay equally unjustified? Finally, in regards to
socially responsible lending, the claim by APACS
that ‘‘the industry considers itself to be operating to
very high standards of responsible lending’’ is
unsustainable (APACS, 2006).
The problem of financial distress among con-
sumers is growing and cannot be ignored—left to
market forces it is likely that sustained media pressure
will eventually force a government to introduce a
lending code backed by statutory regulation. In this
scenario the advent of such regulation may well see
no winners. Those currently able to access lending
may well find themselves denied credit under a
statutory code, while the costs of such regulation will
have to be met by the banks and so ultimately, by
the customer.
In conclusion, although the full RLI concept can
be argued to have been too radical and ahead of its
time, some of its underlying ideas have appeared in
other accepted forms, for example, bank credit data-
sharing and cost of borrowing (Henderson, 2006).
Thus, given the unresolved rising debt in the U.K.
and the current harmonisation and responsibility
practices, an RLI-based initiative which is both
proactive and reactive to the development of the
credit sector may still have a future in some revised
format. However, it is likely that it is grounded in
conventional banking practice rather than in the
stakeholder engagement perspective of the original
RLI.
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